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ture that is excessively di¢ cult to restructure. A bankruptcy regime for
sovereigns can alleviate this ine¢ ciency but only if it is endowed with
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contracts. A bankrupcty regime that makes sovereign debt easier to re-
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1 Introduction
Sovereign debt restructuring has been a major policy issue for the international
community since the mid 1990s. A new source of concern that has emerged, in
particular, is that orderly debt restructuring has been made more di¢ cult by
the greater dispersion of debt holdings among a large number of small investors
around the world. The nature of these coordination problems has been dramat-
ically illustrated by the 2001 Argentine sovereign default.1 Due to the perceived
greater complexity in coordinating negotiations between debtholders and sov-
ereigns a number of prominent commentators and the international community
have advocated ex-post policy interventions to facilitate debt restructuring.2
The increase in debt dispersion has been largely brought about by a greater
reliance on bond issues by sovereign borrowers. In the debt crises of the 1980s,
most of sovereign debt was composed of syndicated bank loans and o¢ cial loans.
Although creditor coordination problems were not absent, it was possible for
creditor banks and central bankers to negotiate with debtors and the IMF and to
work out a debt restructuring agreement. The resolution of the debt crises of the
1980s also gave rise to a new framework for sovereign debt restructuring, with
institutions such as the Paris Club and the London Club that helped coordinate
creditors and set certain rules of the game for sovereign debt restructuring. This
framework, however, is ill-equipped to deal with the more recent sovereign debt
crises, which often involve much more severe coordination problems between a
large number of small bondholders.
1After three years of halfhearted negotiations, the Argentine government launched a global
debt exchange for 152 domestic and foreign securities amounting to 60 percent of its GDP.
Although Argentina was able to successfully exchange its existing debts for lower face-value
claims with a majority of creditors, it continued and still continues to face a signicant fraction
of holdouts as well as a large number of law suits whose execution is still pending. Looking
forward, no framework for sovereign debt restructuring has been put in place to deal with sov-
ereign defaults similar to Argentinas in the future. See Blustein (2005) for a detailed account
of the Argentina debt crisis and also Bolton and Skeel (2005) Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2007) and Gelpern and Gulati (2007) for an analysis of the Argentine debt exchange of 2004.
2See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) for a review of the main proposals.
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What would be the optimal framework for sovereign debt restructuring in
the new nancial environment? It is tempting to think about this question by
analogy with corporate nance. Indeed, the US corporate bankruptcy regime,
which grew out of equity receiverships set up to deal with the restructuring of
failed railroad bonds in the 19th century, addresses essentially the same issues
encountered today in sovereign defaults (Bolton, 2003). At the same time, it
is also important to keep in mind the dimensions along which sovereign debt
di¤ers from corporate debt, in particular the much weaker contractual enforce-
ment resulting from national sovereignty. Unlike rms, sovereigns cannot be
liquidated and there is very little income or collateral that they can credibly
pledge in repayment to creditors.
Because of this weaker contractual enforcement some economists have argued
in favor of maintaining the status quo (Dooley, 2000; Shleifer, 2003). They
contend that the structure of sovereign debt has been deliberately designed to
make debt-restructuring more di¢ cult, partly in response to the debt crises and
restructurings of the 1980s, which had revealed the full extent of the willingness-
to-pay problem.3 This view leads to the Panglossian conclusion that sovereign
debt restructuring should not be made easier: a policy intervention that aims
to reduce the costs of restructuring sovereign debt, while improving ex-post
e¢ ciency, will undermine ex-ante e¢ ciency by raising the cost of borrowing and
reducing the amount of lending to emerging market countries.
Against this background, our article aims to spell out the conditions under
which a new framework for sovereign debt restructuring would be desirable, as
well as the essential features of such a framework. Our analysis is based on a
stylized model of sovereign debt, whose main features and implications can be
3This is, of course, unlikely to be the only reason for the shift from bank loans to bonds in
sovereign nance. To some extent, this shift is part of a wider trend towards securitization.
Still, there is evidence that market participants viewed bonds as more secure than bank loans
because they were more di¢ cult to restructure (Bolton and Jeanne, 2005).
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summarized as follows.
First, in line with the literature on the willingness-to-pay problem, we con-
sider an environment with very weak contractual enforcement of sovereign debt
contracts. We assume that the sovereign cannot credibly pledge domestic out-
put or domestic assets in repayment of its debt, and repays only to avoid certain
default costs.
Second, the sovereign must borrow from multiple lenders and cannot com-
mit to a given overall debt structure. This assumption referred to as the
non-exclusivity problem in nancial contracting theory reects a form of
contractual incompleteness. The contract between the sovereign and a given
lender cannot be made contingent on the contracts with all the other lenders,
in particular the future lenders who have not yet lent to the sovereign.4
Third, we assume that the sovereign can issue di¤erent forms of debt, some of
which are more di¢ cult to restructure than others. By choosing the structure of
its debt ex ante the government can make it more or less di¢ cult to restructure
ex post.
The rst two assumptions are standard in the sovereign debt literature,
and reect the relative incompleteness of sovereign debt contracts compared
with other forms of debt.5 The third assumption is a logical necessity in a
model that endogenizes the renegotiabilityof debt as the outcome of a market
equilibrium.
4We discuss the underlying reasons for this form of contract incompleteness at the end of
section 2. Non-exclusivity will be endogenized as the result of monitoring costs in section 9.
5 In contrast to corporate debt, for which courts can enforce creditorssubordination prior-
ities, there is no easy way of enforcing priority covenants for sovereign debt. There is a large
corporate nance and legal literature, as well as a large body of case law, on debt seniority
and priority covenants as instruments aimed at reducing the risk of debt dilution. The in-
sights from the corporate nance literature cannot be directly transposed to sovereign debt.
The seniority of corporate debt is explicit, contractually specied and enforced by courts. It
is based to a large extent on collateral. In contrast, there is very little collateral that sov-
ereigns can o¤er to creditors. Of the 79 developing and emerging market countries that had
at least one public sector international loan or bond outstanding on January 1, 2003, the face
value of collateralized debt was only 6.2 percent of the face value of total outstanding debt
(Zettelmeyer, 2003).
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We then show that under this set of assumptions, sovereign debt will in
general be excessively di¢ cult to restructure in equilibrium. The reason is that,
at any given point in time the sovereign may be tempted to lower the interest
rate at which it borrows by diluting its outstanding debt with new debt that is
more di¢ cult to restructure. Lenders, of course, anticipate this behavior and
try to protect themselves against future dilution by making their claims hard
to restructure. The laissez-faire equilibrium thus results in an ine¢ cient debt
structure, in the sense that deadweight default costs will be paid more often than
would be the case if a social planner determined the structure of the sovereigns
debt.
One concept that plays a key role in our analysis is de facto seniority in se-
lective defaults. The sovereign will in certain states of nature default selectively
on parts of its debts that are easier to renegotiate that is, default only on rene-
gotiable debt, and not on the debt that is harder to renegotiate. This gives rise
to a form of e¤ective seniority of less renegotiable debt over more renegotiable
debt. This seniority is de facto (as opposed to de jure) because it is the result
of the ex post power of nuisance of the parties rather than the implementation
of clauses in ex ante debt contracts.
This feature of the model is consistent with the experience of sovereign debt
restructuring over the past twenty years. Selective defaults on sovereign debt
are a common occurrence in the real world. During most of the 1990s the
di¤erential treatment of sovereign claims has followed a pattern that suggests
de facto seniority of international bonds over bank loans. Sovereigns have often
defaulted on their bank debt while staying current on their bonded liabilities.6
6Based on Standard & Poors data on 38 rated sovereigns over the period 1975-2003 (re-
ported in Beers and Chambers, 2003), the probability of being in default on bonds conditional
on a default on bank loans is only 6.4 percent. The restructuring of Russian sovereign debt
(August 1998-August 2000) is typical of this pattern. Domestic debt and Soviet era London
and Paris Club debts have been restructured, while Eurobonds have been left untouched.
Market participants have viewed this latest Russian debt restructuring episode as further cor-
roboration of the sovereignstendency of treating creditors di¤erently according to their power
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Market participants were also well aware that such behavior resulted in an
implicit seniority structure a¤ecting the pricing and valuation of debt.7
Our paper argues that there is, therefore, a role for policy intervention in
sovereign lending that would improve both ex-ante and ex-post e¢ ciency. This
policy intervention should take the form of enforcing a de jure priority rule by
either facilitating the enforcement of priority covenants or by facilitating the
restructuring of junior debts issued by the sovereign. A bankruptcy regime for
sovereigns could mitigate the ine¢ ciency associated with the race to seniority by
enforcing a default seniority rule or rst-in-time rule.8 We argue, furthermore,
that to enforce this seniority rule the bankruptcy regime would not require more
powers of enforcement on sovereigns than under the status quo. On the contrary,
the intervention could take the form of weakening enforcement of junior debts
by facilitating their restructuring.
While our conclusions are less Panglossian than our premises, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that they do not provide unconditional support for any form
of intervention that facilitates debt restructuring. Such policy interventions, if
poorly designed, could easily be welfare-reducing. In particular, a sovereign debt
restructuring regime that simply solves coordination failures between creditors
ex post may well reduce welfare in our model. The main benets of a bank-
ruptcy regime for sovereigns, in our view, arise from the establishment of a
legal seniority rule between creditors.9 Our emphasis on the need to di¤eren-
of nuisance.
7Bolton and Jeanne (2005) report a number of quotes by market participants suggesting
that this was the case.
8The rst-in-time rule has been advocated for corporate debt, among others, by White
(1980) and Schwartz (1989). Bolton and Skeel (2004) outline how a bankruptcy procedure for
sovereigns could be designed to legally enforce such a priority rule.
9Other authors have emphasized the importance of seniority in sovereign debt. Roubini
and Setser (2004), for example, downplay the importance of creditor coordination problems
but view the absence of an enforceable priority structure for the sovereigns own debt as
one of the basic problems [...] that arise in a debt restructuring. Tirole (2002, chapter 4)
discusses the contracting externalities that may arise in the issuance of sovereign debt and
mentions seniority as a possible solution to this problem.
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tiate across creditors in the debt restructuring process contrasts in particular
with the conventional wisdom that creditors should be treated equally in debt
restructuring agreements (G-10, 1996; G-22, 1998).
Our paper is related to several lines of literature on sovereign debt and cor-
porate nance. The idea that it may be desirable to create a debt structure
that is di¢ cult to renegotiate under limited enforcement is a familiar theme in
corporate nance. See, for example Hart and Moore (1995), Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Diamond and Rajan (2001) and
Diamond (2004). The ine¢ ciencies resulting from non-exclusivity in debt con-
tracts have also long been noted in the corporate nance literature. Fama and
Miller (1972, chapter 4) provide an early discussion of how lenders can protect
themselves from dilution by making their loans senior (see also White, 1980
and Schwartz, 1989). Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) show however that seniority is
not always a perfect antidote to the non-exclusivity problem in the presence of
debtors moral hazard, and Bisin and Rampini (2006) establish that bankruptcy
law improves welfare to the extent that it imposes exclusivity by enforcing the
seniority of early lenders.
The non-exclusivity problem has also received some attention in the litera-
ture on sovereign debt. Early contributions include Kletzers (1984) analysis of
the sovereign debt market when creditors do not observe the borrowers total
indebtedness, and Cohens (1991, chapter 4) model of sovereign debt dilution.
Bi (2007) endogenizes the maturity structure of sovereign debt in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign debt with dilution. How-
ever, most papers in the sovereign debt literature circumvent the non-exclusivity
problem by assuming it away in one way or another. For example, Kletzer and
Wright (2000) assume a partial form of exclusivity by imposing a moratorium
on new debt until the sovereign repays its outstanding creditors. Kovrijnykh
and Szentes (2007) go even further and explicitly assume seniority of outstand-
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ing creditors relative to new lenders. Another approach in Wright (2005) is to
restrict entry by assuming that the sovereign must borrow from a given pool
of lenders.In this paper we assume free entry by a large number of competitive
lenders.
Other recent contributions that focus on sovereign debt restructuring are
Ghosal and Miller (2003) and Jeanne (2008) who show how a bankruptcy regime
for sovereigns might improve welfare by completing existing incomplete sov-
ereign debt contracts. Similarly, Haldane et al. (2005) and Weinschelbaum and
Wynne (2005) compare the merits of a statutory bankruptcy regime with col-
lective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts. Also, Pitchford and Wright
(2007) endogenize the cost of restructuring in the form of an ine¢ cient delay
in bargaining between the sovereign and its creditors, and evaluate the wel-
fare impact of collective action clauses. None of these studies look at ex ante
contractual externalities between lenders or discuss issues related to seniority.
Finally, our paper is related to the companion article Bolton and Jeanne (2007),
in which sovereign debt may also be excessively di¢ cult to restructure under
laissez-faire because of a contractual externality. However, the mechanisms em-
phasized in the present paper are di¤erent and focus on dilution dynamics and
their implications for seniority in sovereign debt.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the
main assumptions of the model. Section 3 shows how the non-renegotiability of
debt can make it e¤ectively senior. Sections 4 and 5 compare the cases when
the sovereign respectively can and cannot commit not to dilute its debt. Section
6 shows how non-renegotiable debt can be used to forestall dilution, as well as
the e¢ ciency costs involved. Section 7 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 8
draws some normative implications from the theory, highlighting in particular
the welfare benets of establishing de jure seniority in sovereign debt. Finally,
Section 9 presents some extensions of the model, and Section 10 concludes with
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thoughts on possible directions for further research.
2 The model: assumptions
We consider a small open economy over three periods with a single homogenous
good that can be consumed or invested. The representative resident of this
economy may raise funds from the rest of the world by issuing (sovereign) debt
in the rst two periods (t = 0; 1). This debt is to be repaid in the last period
(t = 2). The funds raised in the rst two periods can be used for consumption
or investment purposes. For simplicity we shall assume that the expenditure is
indivisible and that it has the same level g in periods 0 and 1.
To keep the analysis as tractable as possible we specify the following simple
form for the utility function of the representative resident:
U = 0V0 + 1V1 + c
where,
1. c denotes the consumption level of the representative resident in period 2,
and
2. t is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the expenditure is made in
period t = 0; 1, and Vt represents the utility value of the expenditure. This
value may be generated through additional consumption or through public
investment in infrastructure, health, schooling, etc. These expenditures
may be e¢ cient or not (Vt may be higher or lower than g).
The representative resident produces stochastic output y in period 2. The
probability distribution over output is denoted by f(). For simplicity we nor-
malize period 0 and 1 output to zero this assumption will be relaxed later and
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does not matter for our main results. Finally, the sovereign is assumed to act
on behalf of the representative resident and maximizes her welfare.
Under autarky this representative resident would only be able to achieve a
welfare level of
E0(U) = E0(y).
By borrowing from the rest of the world she may be able to enhance her
welfare. We shall take it that the sovereign debt market is perfectly competitive
and that the equilibrium riskless interest rate is equal to zero. But that is
not to say that the sovereign debt market is perfectly e¢ cient. Indeed, as we
already hinted at, two forms of moral hazard limit the e¢ ciency of the sovereign
debt market in our model: the classical willingness-to-pay problem in sovereign
lending (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) and, debt dilution where the sovereign
reduces the value of outstanding debt by taking out new risky debt.
If sovereign debt markets were perfectly e¢ cient and the sovereign were able
to perfectly commit to repaying its debts, then it would raise g in period t = 1; 2
if and only if this increased domestic welfare (Vt > g). The Modigliani-Miller
theorem tells us that the rst-best e¢ cient repayment stream is indeterminate
and that any agreed repayment stream, with an expected value of (0 + 1)g
would be equivalent.
We assume that the sovereign enters debt contracts with foreign lenders (we
will consider more general contracts later). There is a large number of lenders
in periods 0 and 1, each one with an amount g of loanable funds. Thus the
sovereign will have to borrow from at least two di¤erent lenders in period 0 and
in period 1. All lenders are risk neutral and require the same expected return,
which is normalized to 0. There is perfect competition between lenders, so that
the sovereign can extract all the surplus from the lending relationships.
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To be able to model a heterogeneous sovereign debt structure we also as-
sume that there are two types of lenders: one type with whom the sovereign
can renegotiate the repayment of the debt (type r) and one type with whom
renegotiation is impossible (type n). We shall call the loans from the two types
of lenders respectively renegotiable debt (or r-debt) and non-renegotiable debt
(or n-debt). Renegotiable debt and non-renegotiable debt can be interpreted as
respectively syndicated bank loans and bonds without collective action clauses
(Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Lipworth and Nystedt, 2001).10
Debt repayments take place in period 2, when domestic output becomes
available. We denote by D0 the period-2 repayment promised to the rst lender
in period 0; and by D1 the promised repayments on debt issued in period 1.
The sovereigns debt structure, thus, is characterized by two pairs (t; Dt)t=0;1,
where t = r; n is an indicator variable for the type of the lender in period t.
In period 2 the sovereigns total liabilities coming to maturity are:
D = D0 +D1:
There is a mixture of r-debt and n-debt if the sovereign has not issued the same
type of debt in the rst two periods. We respectively denote by Dr and Dn the
amounts of r-debt and n-debt to be repaid in period 2.
The promise to repay D is credible only if it is in the sovereigns interest
to repay ex post. We follow the sovereign debt literature by assuming that the
sovereign repays its debts only as a way of avoiding a costly default. As in
Sachs and Cohen (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, chapter 6), we model
the cost of default as a proportional output loss, y.11 Obstfeld and Rogo¤
10 In the latter case, a type-n lender consists of a pool of uncoordinated small bondholders.
Of course, the loan could be originated by a syndicate of underwriting banks before it is
distributed to small investors, and what matters is the structure of the debt at the time of
repayment, not at the time of issuance.
11The literature on sovereign debt and the willingness-to-pay problem puts forward several
explanations for why sovereigns repay their debts, ranging from the fear of market exclusion
(Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981) to creditor sanctions (Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989) and to the costs
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(1996) interpret this cost as a sanction, but in our context it is best to interpret
default costs as costs arising from the loss of market access during protracted
debt restructuring negotiations or uncoordinated legal actions by individual
creditors.12
Whether creditors can be persuaded to lift the sanctions depends on whether
debt is of the renegotiable or non-renegotiable type. We assume that the holders
of renegotiable debt (the r-creditors for short) can be coordinated at no cost
around a debt restructuring agreement in which they consent to lift the cost
y in exchange of a payment . In contrast, such an agreement is impossible
to reach with the holders of n-debt (the n-creditors), since they are widely
dispersed and the debt contract does not include any mechanism allowing them
to collectively agree to a debt restructuring plan. The n-creditors automatically
impose the sanction if they are not fully repaid. This ine¢ ciency captures the
idea that when debt holders are widely dispersed it will be di¢ cult to reach an
agreement acceptable to everyone in a timely fashion and to avoid free riding
by hold-out creditors.
More formally, we capture the creditor coordination problem by assuming
that there is a very small amount of domestic assets, ", that creditors may
try to seize in a sovereign default. Creditors attempt to get hold of those
assets by litigating in court, which prevents the default from being cured and
imposes the default cost y on the sovereign. The key point is that although
the value of seizable assets " is very small it is su¢ cient to fully repay a small
number of atomistic creditors. This implies that in a Nash equilibrium, all the
of collateral disruption induced by sovereign defaults (Broner and Ventura, 2006). Recently
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) have argued that the observed levels of outstanding sovereign
debt and debt repayments can only be explained if one assumes that sovereign defaults result
in signicant output cost.
12The loss of market access comes from trigger strategy punishments in models a la Eaton
and Gersowitz (1981). In the real world, potential new lenders are also concerned that litigat-
ing holdout creditors could attach the repayments in court. The loss of access, in that case,
lasts as long as the debt has not been successfully restructured with all creditors.
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creditors litigate because of the same free-rider problem as in Diamond and
Rajan (2001) or Jeanne (2008).13 This coordination problem can be solved if
there is a mechanism that protects the sovereign from decentralized litigation
and lets the sovereign negotiate with a representative of all creditors.
The sequence of actions in period 2 is as depicted in Figure 1. First, the
government decides whether to repay its debts fully or default. Following a
default, the r-creditors make a take-or-leave repayment demand of   Dr. The
government then accepts or rejects the r-creditorsdemand. Acceptance implies
a partial default on r-debt, in which the r-creditors receive a fraction =Dr of
their claims and the n-creditors are fully repaid. Rejection implies a full default
in which the government repays nothing to its r-and n- creditors and incurs the
cost y. Figure 1 gives the payo¤s of the government and its creditors under
full repayment, and partial and full default.
The di¤erence between the two types of creditors relates to their ability
to act collectively, not in the size of the cost they can impose on the debtor
or in their bargaining power. The n-creditors, as a group, cannot negotiate
a debt reduction with the sovereign. By contrast, the r-creditors can bargain
collectively. They have all the bargaining power, since they make a take-or-leave
o¤er. They will ask for a full repayment,  = Dr, whenever possible, and for
a lower repayment only to preempt a costly sovereign default that reduces the
total repayment (to zero in our model).
This formulation captures in a simple way the fact that some types of sov-
ereign debt are more di¢ cult to restructure than others because of coordination
problems between creditors. Here, we simplify the situation in the extreme by
assuming that n-debt is impossible to restructure. This assumption trivially im-
plies that debt restructuring, if it occurs, involves r-debt only. This is a simple
13All the creditors litigate if litigation is free. If litigation is costly the equilibrium number
of litigating creditors will be such that the payo¤ from litigation is equal to its cost.
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representation of the selective defaults which, as mentioned in the introduction,
are one way that sovereigns discriminate between di¤erent classes of creditors
in the real world.
To summarize, the timing of moves and events starting from period 0 is as
follows. In period 0 the r-lenders and n-lenders make competitive bids to lend
g to the sovereign in the form of debt repayable in period 2. In period 1 the
lenders bid again to lend g to the sovereign. We assume that the sovereigns
borrowing decisions are made sequentially and that the sovereign cannot commit
to its future debt management in period 0. This assumption seems reasonable
as a benchmark, since in the real world there is no obvious way a sovereign can
commit not to issue debt in the future. In period 2 output y is realized and debts
are repaid (or not). In case of a default the debt restructuring continuation game
described above is triggered. Finally, the representative resident consumes the
remaining output and the game ends.
We conclude this section with an important remark about the role of contract
incompleteness in our analysis. We have assumed that the sovereign enters
debt contracts with foreign lenders, which are promises to repay xed amounts.
Restricting the attention to debt contracts means that the feasible nancial
contracts are incomplete in two ways:
 the repayment cannot be made contingent on the realized level of output
(that is, we exclude repayment functions Dt(y));
 the repayment to the rst lender cannot be made contingent on the contract
with the second lender (that is, we exclude repayment functions D0(1; D1)).
Although both assumptions are realistic and standard in the sovereign debt
literature, they require an explanation. The rst assumption, that the sovereign
cannot issue GDP-indexed debt, is in line with the fact that the overwhelming
majority of sovereign debts are not GDP-indexed. This is somewhat of a puzzle,
however, as these debts appear to be feasible, desirable, and most importantly,
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relatively immune to manipulation, as GDP for a whole country can be measured
and observed (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). Indeed, in our simple model the
sovereign would be able to achieve the rst best by issuing GDP-indexed n-debt.
One reason why we observe so little GDP-indexed debt may be that sov-
ereigns willingness to repay has many other determinants besides domestic
GDP.14 This extra uncertainty could be captured, in our simple model, by
assuming that  is uncertain viewed from periods 0 and 1. What would be
required, then, is debt indexed to the cost of default. Obviously, the informa-
tional requirements to be able to enforce such a debt instrument are likely to be
prohibitive. In sum, in a richer model, where both y and  are uncertain, our
analysis would apply even if the sovereign was able to issue GDP-indexed debt.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, however, we have assumed that  is
certain and than D is independent of y.
The second form of incompleteness that the contract with the rst lender
cannot be made contingent on the contract with the second lender is also key
to our analysis. It generates the non-exclusivity problem and the risk of dilution
that make sovereign debt excessively di¢ cult to restructure in the laissez-faire
equilibrium. It is a priori a realistic assumption, as it would seem very di¢ cult to
write a debt contract contingent on all the possible borrowing decisions that the
sovereign could take during the life of the contract. However, the non-exclusivity
problem could be mitigated to some extent by shortening the maturity of debt.
In reality we do observe sovereign debt of various maturities, and one role of
short-term debt may indeed be to mitigate the risk of dilution. For the sake of
simplicity, we postpone the analysis of short-term debt contracts to section 9.
14For example, the domestic political support for sovereign debt repayment, as it is deter-
mined by the redistributive implications of a default. See Guembel and Sussman (2005) for a
model. Evidence that negative output shocks are not a strong predictor of sovereign defaults
suggests that these other determinants play an important role (Tomz and Wright, 2007).
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3 Strategic default
In this section we determine when the sovereign repays its debts in period 2 and
when it defaults, taking Dr and Dn as given. The debtor country may repay
all its debts, default partially, or fully. Default without restructuring results in
an output loss of y.
Let us assume that the sovereign defaults. Is the default full or partial? This
depends on whether the r-creditors can make an acceptable o¤er   0 to the
sovereign. In the event of a partial default on r-debt, the sovereigns payo¤ is
y     Dn
if it accepts the o¤er  from r-creditors, which is the case if and only if y     
Dn  (1   )y. The r-creditors can make an acceptable o¤er, therefore, if and
only if,
Dn  y: (1)
The holders of r-debt always prefer a positive repayment   0 to a full default
with no repayment. Since they have all the bargaining power, they therefore
set  at the level that makes the sovereign indi¤erent between a partial and a
full default, or
 = y  Dn:
By contrast, if Dn > y the r-creditors cannot make an acceptable o¤er and the
default must be full. The sovereign is better o¤ defaulting on all its debts than
selectively defaulting on r-debt. Conditional on a default, therefore, the default
is partial if y is larger than Dn=, and full otherwise.
When is the sovereign better o¤ defaulting? To answer this question we only
need to compare the sovereigns payo¤ under no default,
y  Dr  Dn;
16
and its payo¤ under partial or full default, which in either case is
(1  )y;
since all renegotiation rents are extracted by r-creditors. Thus, the sovereign





A partial default, therefore, occurs if and only if conditions (1) and (2) are
met. Ordering these cases in terms of y then gives the following result:
Proposition 1 The sovereigns debt repayment strategy is as follows:
(i) full repayment: if y  Dn+Dr , the sovereign fully repays its renegotiable
and non-renegotiable debt.
(ii) partial default: if Dn  y < Dn+Dr , the sovereign fully repays its non-
renegotiable debt and repays y  Dn to the holders of renegotiable debt.
(ii) full default: if y < Dn , the sovereign defaults on all outstanding debts
and repays nothing.
Proof. See discussion above.
This proposition claries the notion that non-renegotiable debt is e¤ectively
senior to renegotiable debt. In the case of partial default, the allocation of the
repayment between r-creditors and n-creditors is the same as if the latter enjoyed
strict seniority over the former. Because of this e¤ective seniority, n-creditors
have a larger expected recovery ratio than r-creditors, so that the interest rate
should be lower on n-debt than on r-debt.
4 Optimal debt structure under commitment
What is the ex-ante optimal combination of n-debt and r-debt? The answer
to this question depends on whether the government can commit not to dilute
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debt issued in period 0 with new debt issued in period 1. In this section we
assume that the government can credibly commit not to dilute its initial debt.
We thereby isolate the only remaining moral hazard problem in our model: the
classic willingness-to-pay problem. This assumption, although not realistic, pro-
vides a convenient benchmark for the case with no commitment, where dilution
is possible.
Let us assume that the sovereign nances the expenditure in both periods
t = 0 and t = 1. There are three types of debt structures to consider:
 pure r-debt, with r-debt in both periods: in each period the sovereign






f(y)dy + bDr Z +1
2 bDr= f(y)dy: (3)
 pure n-debt, with n-debt in both periods: in each period the sovereign
issues a promise to repay bDn satisfying
g = bDn Z +1
2 bDn= f(y)dy: (4)
mixed debt, with n-debt in one period and r-debt in the other: the promised
repayments eDr and eDn satisfy
g =
Z ( eDr+ eDn)=
eDn= (y   eDn)f(y)dy + eDr
Z +1
( eDr+ eDn)= f(y)dy; (5)
g = eDn Z +1eDn= f(y)dy: (6)
The mnemonic is that a debt structure with only one form of debt is denoted
with a hat, whereas a structure that mixes two forms of debt is denoted with a
tilde. It does not matter, viewed from period 2, if the debt has been issued in
period 0 or in period 1 given that there is no seniority or rst-in-time rule in
place.
15 If this equation admits several solutions we pick the smallest one. This also applies to
equations (4), (5) and (6).
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Given that in any equilibrium investors obtain a zero net expected return,
the equilibrium welfare of the representative agent is equal to the net welfare
benet from the expenditures in the two periods plus the total expected output
net of the cost of default, or16




where Dn = 0, 2 bDn, or eDn in respectively a pure r-debt, pure n-debt and
mixed debt structure. As this expression immediately reveals the representative
agents welfare is highest under the structure with the lowest Dn, namely the
pure r-debt structure. Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under a pure willingness-to-repay problem it is optimal for the
sovereign to issue r-debt in both periods.
Proof. See discussion above.
Renegotiable debt is unambiguously preferable to non-renegotiable debt in
our model. If the government could commit not to dilute, it would never issue n-
debt. This result is in part driven by our assumption that r-creditors are able to
appropriate the entire amount y in debt renegotiations following default. Thus,
n-debt does not have an advantage over r-debt in extracting repayment from
the sovereign. If the bargaining power of the r-creditors were lower than 1 the
sovereign might have to issue n-debt in order to increase its pledgeable output.17
We focus on the extreme case where the creditors have all the bargaining power
in renegotiation for expositional reasons because it yields a clear prediction on
the optimal form of debt.
16Recall that with r-debt the deadweight default costs can be avoided through ex-post debt
restructuring.
17 In the opposite polar case where the creditors have no bargaining power, the sovereign
would be unable to issue r-debt since it would always default on it. The case with intermediate
bargaining power is analyzed in our companion paper Bolton and Jeanne (2007).
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5 Dilution with non-renegotiable debt
We now relax the assumption on commitment made in the previous section and
assume that the sovereign can reoptimize in period 1 in a discretionary way.
We will show that under a weak and plausible assumption on the probability
distribution of output there cannot be an equilibrium with only r-debt in this
case, as the sovereign then always dilutes outstanding r-debt with n-debt in
period 1.
The equilibrium debt type in period 1 is determined by a simple rule: the
sovereign issues the type of debt with the lowest interest rate. This is because








where D is total debt repayment, irrespective of debt types. The sovereigns
problem is thus to minimize D, which is achieved in period 1 by issuing the debt
with the lowest interest rate.
It is easy to see that the interest rate is lower on r-debt than on n-debt if the
only type of debt outstanding is n-debt (because of the higher recovery value of
r-debt in defaults). It follows that if the sovereign has issued n-debt in period
0, then it does not re-issue the same type of debt in period 1. Thus we have the
following result.
Proposition 3 There is no equilibrium in which the sovereign issues n-debt in
both periods 0 and 1.
Proof. See discussion above.
But, is there an equilibrium in which the sovereign issues r-debt in both
periods? The answer is negative if the interest rate is lower on n-debt than on
r-debt in period 1, after the sovereign has issued bDr of r-debt in period 0. We
show in the Appendix that this is the case if the following assumption holds:
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Assumption 1. The output density function f() is increasing in the in-
terval of output levels for which there is default under pure r-debt.
This assumption is both weak and intuitive. An increasing density f()
ensures that selective defaults, in which n-debt dominates r-debt, are more
likely than full defaults, in which r-debt dominates n-debt. It is satised for
most usual specications of f() if default is a tail probability event. Under
Assumption 1 we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Consider an equilibrium in which the sovereign spends g in both
periods t = 0; 1 and cannot commit to a particular debt structure. Then, under
Assumption 1, the sovereign issues a mixture of n-debt and r-debt.
Proof. See the appendix.




This represents the welfare cost of full defaults induced by the n-debt issued in
period 1. Under laissez-faire there is, thus, an excessive level of n-debt issued
relative to the rst-best (in which there is no n-debt).
The nature of the problem faced by the sovereign here is essentially one of
time consistency. The sovereign would like to commit not to issue n-debt but
it is not able to do so. We discuss in sections 8 and 9 how this problem can be
solved contractually or through the creation of new institutions.
6 Non-renegotiable debt to forestall dilution
The analysis in the previous section might suggest that n-debt should be eradi-
cated. We now show that such a conclusion would be hasty because it misses an
important benet of n-debt, which is that it cannot be diluted. The holders of
long-term n-debt are protected against dilution by their e¤ective seniority. The
sovereign, therefore, may issue its long-term debt in the form of non-renegotiable
debt to forestall dilution.
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One of the costs of dilution of r-debt by n-debt is the deadweight cost of a
full default. But another, more subtle, cost is that dilution creates incentives for
overinvestment in period 1. A sovereign with no outstanding debt always makes
an e¢ cient investment decision: spend if and only if the expenditure is socially
e¢ cient (V1 > g) and nance the expenditure with r-debt. But the sovereigns
decision may be distorted by the presence of outstanding r-debt.
To see this, suppose that the sovereign has issued eDr of r-debt in period
0, under the expectation that there will be another investment expenditure in
period 1 nanced with n-debt. This expectation is rational if the sovereign is
indeed better o¤ nancing the expenditure in period 1, or if:
V1 +










g = eDn Z +1eDn= f(y)dy;
and rearranging this condition can be rewritten as:
V1 > V  g   eDn Z eDr=eDn= f(y)dy  
Z ( eDr+ eDn)=
eDr= ( eDn + eDr   y)f(y)dy: (7)
Note that the right-hand term V is lower than g, implying that the invest-
ment expenditure might be undertaken in period 1 even if it is ine¢ cient. The
sovereigns decision is biased towards excessive spending through dilution.
In contrast, if the sovereign had issued n-debt in period 0, there is no dilution
bias since n-debt cannot be diluted. So n-debt is a double-edged sword: n-debt
is an instrument of dilution, but it is also a weapon against dilution. The dual
nature of n-debt is very important for the normative analysis that follows.
Expropriation of outstanding debt through dilution requires both a default
and a debt restructuring. Intuitively, thus, a debt issue that is more di¢ cult
22
to restructure should also be more di¢ cult to dilute. This intuition is captured
in a stark way in our model, as n-debt cannot be diluted at all, because when
period 0 n-creditors are not fully repaid, no other creditors are.18 In contrast,
renegotiable debt can be diluted by subsequent issues of either renegotiable or
non-renegotiable debt.
7 Equilibrium
Suppose now that V1 is stochastic and that it could take values that are strictly
lower than g but no lower than V :
Assumption 2. V1 is uncertain viewed from period 0. It is lower than g
with a nonzero probability but higher than V with probability 1.
This assumption is meant to make the problem interesting without adding
unnecessary complications. The assumption that V1 can be lower than g im-




V1)h(V1)dV1, where h() is the pdf of V1. The role of the assumption that V1
remains above V is only to simplify the analysis by ensuring that the sovereign
always dilutes outstanding r-debt in period 1.19
Under Assumption 2 the equilibrium is relatively simple to characterize.
First, we know that the sovereign issues both n-debt and r-debt (by Proposition
4). But which type of debt is issued rst? If V1 is known ex ante to be larger than
g, then the sovereign is indi¤erent between issuing n-debt in period 0 or in period
1. But if V1 is smaller than g with positive probability the sovereign is strictly
better o¤ issuing n-debt in period 0: the deadweight loss from full defaults is the
18This extreme outcome is driven by our assumption that the recovery value of debt is zero
in a full default. If the recovery value of n-debt were positive, the n-debt issued in period 0
could be diluted in period 1 (by issuing more n-debt if n-creditors were e¤ectively senior to
r-creditors in the restructuring process). Even in this case, however, it would remain true that
n-debt is diluted less often than r-debt.
19Without this assumption one would have to compute the probability of dilution as the
solution of a xed-point problem, and this added analytical complication bring no additional
economic insight. The details are available upon request to the authors.
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same as when n-debt is issued in period 1, but the spending decision in period
1 is e¢ cient. It follows that issuing n-debt in period 0 dominates issuing it in
period 1.
Proposition 5 The sovereign issues n-debt in period 0, and when V1 > g
issues r-debt in period 1.
Proof. See discussion above.
In sum, it is optimal to use n-debt as a protection against dilution rather
than as a tool of dilution, and therefore to issue n-debt early.
8 Public policy
If sovereign debt is ine¢ ciently structured, is there a case for policy intervention,
and if so what form of intervention would be desirable? In particular, is there
a case for intervening to facilitate debt renegotiations ex post, or should there
be other forms of intervention? We take up these questions in this section.
One can distinguish two approaches to facilitating sovereign debt restruc-
turing. The contractual approach focuses on making debt contracts easier to
renegotiate by including collective actions clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond is-
sues.20 The more ambitious statutory approach proposes the creation of new
institutions that supersede contracts. The latter approach reached a culmina-
tion point when the IMFs Anne Krueger put forward the idea of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) that would fulll some of the functions
of a bankruptcy regime (Krueger, 2002).21
20These clauses allow for the reduction in the payment terms of a bond issue if a super-
majority of bondholders (often a 2/3 majority) approves the proposed reduction or haircut.
If a debtor wants to renegotiate the payment terms of a bond issue with collective action
clauses, it can approach the trustee representing the bondholders with a renegotiation o¤er,
who in turn can put the proposal to a vote of all bondholders (see Gelpern and Gulati, 2007,
or Eichengreen, 2003).
21The notion of a bankruptcy court for sovereigns" has a long history that goes back to
Adam Smith. See Rogo¤ and Zettelmeyer (2002) for historical background and a review of
the recent developments on this proposal. The SDRM failed to gain enough support in the
international community and the main outgrowth of this debate has been the spread of CACs.
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8.1 Making debt easier to restructure
Suppose, for simplicity, that the sovereigns debt is the form of bonds held by a
large number of creditors. In terms of our model, r-debt would be interpreted
as a bond issued with a collective action clause, while n-debt would be a bond
issued without such a clause. Then Proposition 4 says that one half of the sov-
ereigns debt will not have a collective action clause in equilibrium, even though
it would be optimal to include such a clause in all the debts (by Proposition
2). The purely voluntary approach to the adoption of collective action clauses,
thus, is unlikely to work.
One way of making sovereign debt easier to renegotiate would be to make
collective action clauses mandatory or to strongly encourage their adoption
with subsidies, public pressure or moral suasion so that all the debts are of
type r. Equivalently, one can establish a bankruptcy regime that forces n-
creditors to renegotiate in the same way as r-creditors.
For concreteness, consider a bankruptcy regime where all creditors are re-
quired to delegate renegotiation authority to a creditor committee. Individual
creditors see their litigation rights suspended, and must all accept the out-
come of the negotiation between their representative and the sovereign. Thus,
the free-riding equilibrium in which individual creditors were seeking to seize a
small amount of assets " is eliminated.
We assume that the n-debt is restructured in the same way as the r-debt.
The creditor committee has the exclusive right to make a restructuring proposal
^. The sovereign can only accept or reject the o¤er (as before, creditors have
all the bargaining power). If the sovereign rejects the o¤er the restructuring
game ends, with the sovereign getting y(1   ) and creditors getting no debt
repayment.22 If the sovereign accepts the o¤er his payo¤ is y   ^ and creditors
22An alternative end-game could be to let the sovereign revert back to uncoordinated renego-
tiations with creditors. The sovereigns payo¤ in that case would be unchanged but creditors
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get ^. Creditors would then collectively concede a haircut of D ^D . The
game is e¤ectively the same as when all the debt is of type r: there is no
meaningful di¤erence, therefore, between mandatory collective action clauses
and a bankruptcy regime (at this stage of our analysis).
Making debt easier to restructure does not always improve ex ante e¢ ciency
in our model. To see this, suppose that all debts are made renegotiable in one
way or another (through mandatory collective action clauses or a bankruptcy
regime). The benet is that the deadweight cost of full defaults disappears.
But the cost is that the period-1 investment decision is now distorted because
of dilution. Under Assumption 2 dilution will be systematic in period 1. Thus,
making debts easier to renegotiate increases welfare if and only if the deadweight
loss from full defaults is larger than the welfare loss from dilution. That is if






One can construct examples in which this condition may be satised or not, so
that the welfare benets from facilitating renegotiation are ambiguous.
Making debt easier to renegotiate could also give rise to credit rationing in
period 0. To see this, suppose that the countrys pledgeable income is su¢ cient
to nance the expenditure in one period only (g < E(y) < 2g). Then the
sovereign cannot nance expenditure in period 0 because of the expectation of
dilution in period 1. This is so even though investment might be more e¢ cient
in period 0 than in period 1 (V0 > V1). Our results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume that a bankruptcy regime coordinates all the creditors
in a sovereign debt restructuring renegotiation. Then welfare could be higher or
lower than under laissez-faire, and in general remains strictly below the (com-
payo¤s could be higher, with n-creditors again beneting from their higher de facto seniority.
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mitment) rst-best level.
Proof. See discussion above.
8.2 Establishing seniority
Facilitating debt renegotiations produces ambiguous e¤ects because renegotia-
tion does not address the underlying source of ine¢ ciency: the non-exclusivity
problem and the race to seniority. Sovereigns have an incentive to bias their
debt structure towards hard debt that is di¢ cult to renegotiate as a way of
achieving de facto seniority and thus limit the extent of debt dilution. A sov-
ereign engages in this form of ine¢ cient debt structuring because there is no
easy way of implementing seniority de jure. Replacing de facto seniority pre-
vailing under laissez-faire with de jure seniority could increase welfare. In our
model a time-based priority rule where early lenders (who have lent in period 0)
are senior to later lenders (who are lending in period 1) would lead to a Pareto
improvement.
For concreteness, consider the restructuring procedure described in the previ-
ous section with the following modication: the repayment ^ the sovereign agrees
to is distributed among creditors according to absolute priority, with priority
based on a rst-in-time issuance rule. That is, for a given debt D = (D02+D12),
the holders of the debt claim D12 would not recover anything out of the agreed
repayment ^ until the holders of the debt D02 are paid in full. The enforcement
of this rule would entirely eliminate the sovereigns incentives to dilute the out-
standing debt at time t = 1 so that the rst-best outcome is implementable.
Proposition 7 A bankruptcy regime that enforces a time-based de jure priority
rule allows the sovereign to achieve an optimal debt structure, which puts its
welfare at the (commitment) rst-best level.
Proof. See the discussion above.
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Two important further points can be made in our model. First, the op-
timality of the bankruptcy regime does not rely on any violation of sovereign
immunity. Indeed, such a bankruptcy mechanism would not need to be endowed
with more enforcement powers on the sovereign debtor than we have assumed so
far. Conditional on a total repayment y, the sovereign would have no reason to
object to the enforcement of this seniority rule, which does not a¤ect domestic
welfare. The bankruptcy mechanisms statutory powers are only applied to the
the n-creditors who have lent in period 1 and who lose their de facto seniority.
The second observation is that the optimal seniority rule would be di¢ cult
to implement contractually. To see this, suppose that the period-0 r-lenders
add a clause specifying that their debts are senior to all future debts. Such a
clause would provide protection against dilution by future r-lenders but would
be ine¤ective against dilution by n-debt, since the n-creditors are not included in
a future restructuring agreement. Thus, de jure seniority is trumped by de facto
seniority if it is not supported by a statutory regime that forces all creditors to
participate in a restructuring.23
The highly simplied procedure outlined above is an idealization that works
in the context of our simple model. Real world sovereign debt restructurings
are, of course, much more complex. A di¢ cult policy issue is how to actually
structure a sovereign debt restructuring procedure in practice. This problem
is taken up in depth in Bolton and Skeel (2004), who discuss a detailed pro-
posal specifying how a restructuring procedure might be initiated, how di¤erent
23 In addition, a statutory mechanism may dominate the contractual approach even if there is
no n-debt. Contracting on the form of restructuring (in other words, on the division of the pie
among creditors in a restructuring) is tantamount to letting the creditors set up a bankruptcy
scheme contractually, a form of "sovereign pre-pack". It is a well-known result in corporate
bankruptcy theory that a legal bankruptcy institution may do no better than an optimal pre-
pack, if complete contracts are possible. But there are several reasons why it would not be easy
to set up and enforce a sovereign debt pre-pack. In particular, decentralized contractual pre-
packs are likely to involve larger transaction costs than a single statutory bankruptcy regime.
In section 9.1 we actually develop a formal argument along these lines, namely that making
the rst debt contract contingent on the second contract a form of pre-pack is dominated
by a bankruptcy institution with a seniority rule, due to the higher cost of monitoring.
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creditor classes should be formed, how a restructuring plan is determined and
approved, under what conditions additional lending can be granted, and how
the agreement can be ultimately enforced (see also Schwarcz, 2000 and 2004;
and Krueger and Hagan, 2005).
9 Extensions
Another way in which the sovereign could forestall dilution is by issuing short-
term debt. Short-term creditors cannot be diluted as they get to roll over their
debts at terms that reect the dilution of their claims. Can short-term debt
nancing then be a substitute for de jure seniority? This section shows that
this is not the case if it is costly to monitor the sovereign (subsection 9.1) or
if short-term debt raises the risk of default (subsection 9.2). This section also
presents an extension of the model in which it may be optimal to suspend the
time-based seniority rule in a default, which further strengthens the case for a
statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring (subsection 9.3).
9.1 Short-term debt with monitoring
In this section we introduce short-term debt into the model, and show that it is
not an e¤ective tool to forestall dilution if monitoring the sovereigns debt issues
is costly for the lenders. Without any loss of generality we restrict attention to
renegotiable debt (and drop the subscript r to alleviate the notations).
Thus, suppose that the sovereign issues short-term debt in period 0, D01,
to be rolled over in period 1. The debt is repaid in period 1 with the proceeds
of a new debt issue in period 1, D12. We assume that the sovereign does not
default in period 1, so that the interest rate on the debt issued in period 0 is
equal to 0 (D01 = g). To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we consider
an equilibrium in which expenditures g are e¢ cient and the sovereign nances
them in both periods t = 0; 1. The sovereign, thus, issues D01 and D02 in period
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0, and D12 in period 1.
In period 1 the sovereign must raise 2g in the debt market (g to renance
the short-term debt coming to maturity, plus g for the new expenditure). The
key di¤erence with our previous analysis is that the sovereign borrows from the
two lenders at the same time, which removes the dynamic consistency problem
that underpinned our previous results.24
To be able to forestall dilution, however, short-term lenders must have com-
plete information on the sovereigns overall debt obligations. This may require
continuous costly monitoring on their part. We capture this observation in our
model by assuming that period-1 lenders can make two types of bids: with
monitoring, and without monitoring.
A lender who does not monitor makes non-contingent bids, as before. In
contrast, a lender who monitors can make her o¤er contingent on the sovereigns
overall debt. More formally, a bid with monitoring consists of a repayment
function D(0; D0) where 0 and D0 are respectively the type and repayment on
the debt contract with the other lender. Allowing for such bids removes the
second kind of contractual incompleteness that we have assumed so far (non-
exclusivity).
We make the trade-o¤ between monitoring and non-monitoring debt con-
tracts non-trivial by assuming that monitoring involves a cost, denoted by .
Thus a lender o¤ering a monitoring contract will request a higher expected
payo¤, g + , than a lender o¤ering a contract with no monitoring. We think
that monitoring costs are a realistic assumption to introduce in this context.
Whereas in our simple model monitoring occurs only once, real world short-
term creditors would have to continuously monitor the sovereigns debt issues
24The same outcome could be achieved, in our model, by assuming that the sovereign raises
2g in period 0 and puts aside one g to spend in the following period. However, having the
sovereign borrow upfront for all its future needs would not be a viable solution in a model
with a more general dynamic structure.
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in order to forestall dilution.25
The costly monitoring by short-term creditors could be avoided by the in-
stitution of a cheaper form of monitoring through a bankruptcy regime with de
jure seniority. Although a bankruptcy court would still have to incur the costs
of establishing the sovereigns overall debt obligations in the event of default,
the bankruptcy regime would nevertheless be more cost e¢ cient. To see this,
we make the extreme assumption that the bankruptcy regimes debt certica-
tion cost (in period 2) is the same as to the sum of the monitoring costs for
the two short-term lenders: CB = 2. This assumption is extreme as it does
not account for the courts special powers in gathering information, nor does it
account for the duplication of costs by short-term lenders, which a bankruptcy
court could avoid. Despite this assumption, however, we are able to establish
the following result.
Proposition 8 Assume that short-term creditors must pay a monitoring cost to
observe the debt issuances of the sovereign. If the monitoring cost is non-zero, a
bankruptcy regime with de jure seniority dominates laissez-faire with short-term
debt.
Proof. See the appendix.
The laissez-faire equilibrium can be of two types, depending on the level
of the monitoring cost. If  is lower than a threshold , the sovereign issues
short-term r-debt in periods 0 and 1. The lenders monitor the debt structure
in period 1, so that the sovereigns welfare is reduced below the rst-best level
by the total cost of monitoring, 2. Even though we assumed that it had no
comparative advantage in terms of monitoring, a bankruptcy regime o¤ers a
more e¢ cient way of mitigating dilution, because its monitoring cost is paid
only if there is a default. If  is larger than , the laissez-faire equilibrium is
25This insight can be formally established in an extension of our model with innite time.
The details are available upon request to the authors.
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the same as in Proposition 5 (the sovereign issues long-term n-debt in period
0).26
9.2 Short-term debt with default risk
The analysis in the previous section was premised on the assumption that the
sovereign does not default in period 1 on its short-term debt. We now consider
the case where the sovereign can default in period 1, and show that the thrust
of our results is preserved even if there are no monitoring costs.
The debt is repaid in period 1 out of rst-period output y1 and/or the
proceeds of any new debt issued in period 1, D12. As before, we assume that
the sovereign chooses not to default in period 1 as a way of avoiding a default
cost y1, and also that short-term creditors have all the bargaining power in
any debt restructuring. Hence short-term creditors receive y1 in a default (on
r-debt). In addition as seems realistic, we assume that the sovereign cannot
nance the expenditure g in period 1 following a default on its debt issued in
period 0.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we consider an equilibrium in
which y1 and V1 > g are known in period 0, and the sovereign nances the
expenditure g in both periods t = 0; 1. The sovereign, thus, issues D01 = g in
period 0, D12 in period 1, and does not default in period 1. The equilibrium
condition for D12 then is,







(recall that y refers to second period output). This equation says that the
26Short-term debt is not the only form of repeated interaction between the sovereign and
period-0 creditors, and the basic insight of our analysis above carries over to other settings.
For example, a sovereign having issued long-term r-debt in period 0 could try and renegotiate
the repayment of this debt under the threat of dilution in period 1. An e¢ cient and costless
negotiation would avoid the issuance of n-debt in equilibrium and thus implement the rst-
best. However, if renegotiation involves monitoring costs (to verify that the sovereign is not
issuing n-debt in period 1) the basic trade-o¤ is essentially the same as in the case of short-term
debt nancing with monitoring.
32
new expenditure g and the rollover of the short-term debt D01 are nanced by
output y1 and by issuing new short-term debt D12. The value of D12 is, of
course, rationally anticipated in period 0.
It is easy to see that if the sovereign can nance the expenditures with
short-term r-debt in both periods, the (commitment) rst-best is achieved. The
short-term debt coming to maturity in period 1 cannot be diluted by r-debt or
n-debt. This implies that the expenditure is nanced in period 1 only if it is
e¢ cient (V1 > g).
The question is whether it is possible for the sovereign to nance the expen-
ditures with short-term r-debt in both periods. This is the case if the sovereign











This incentive condition may not hold if the default cost y1 is too small.
Using (8), one can see that the incentive condition is satised if and only if
y1  2g V1. We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Assume that the sovereign can default on its short-term debt in
period 1, at an output cost of y1. The rst best is achieved if the sovereign can
nance the expenditure g in t = 0 with short-term r-debt that is rolled over in
period 1. This is possible only if and only if the cost of default in period 1 is
large enough: y1  2g   V1.
Proof. See discussion above.
When y1 is risky it is even harder to e¢ ciently forestall dilution by issuing
short-term debt, as the sovereign would default on its outstanding debt in period
1 whenever there is a su¢ ciently negative output shock in that period. Thus,
the main insight from this analysis is that a strategy of forestalling dilution by
relying on short maturity debt has some limits, and may come with a cost in
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terms of nancial fragility. As a result, the sovereign may issue long-term debt
even if this creates incentives for debt dilution and overborrowing in the future.
9.3 Optimal dilution
One concern one might have with the strict enforcement of a time-based priority
rule is that it may give rise to a debt overhang problem and put the sovereign
in a position ex post where it cannot borrow to nance valuable investments
because it has already accumulated too much debt. As a way of reducing this
risk it may, thus, be desirable to allow for some debt dilution.27 Alternatively,
it may be desirable to allow for deviations from an absolute priority rule under
the sovereign bankruptcy regime, as is the case in corporate bankruptcy. We
explore this idea in this section by assuming that dilution can help the sovereign
to nance a solvency-enhancing policy action in times of nancial distress. For
simplicity, suppose that y is observed one period ahead, so that creditors know
whether the sovereign is going to default in period 1. Instead of an expenditure
g we shall allow the sovereign to take an action in period 1 that can reduce the
negative impact of a default on the domestic economy. This action increases
domestic output by ( + )y in period 2, but requires an expenditure of y in
period 1. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that this increase
in domestic output cannot be pledged in repayment to foreign creditors. We
further assume that the country is not able to nance the new expenditure with
period 1 output, so that it has to borrow y in period 1.
If the bankruptcy court gives absolute priority to the period 0 lenders, then
the sovereign cannot raise any new funds in period 1. For the country to be
able to nance the welfare-enhancing expenditure in period 1, the bankruptcy
regime would have to violate the seniority of early lenders. Thus, suppose that
27Diamond (1993) presents a model in which dilution plays a useful role as a bu¤er against
negative shocks.
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the bankruptcy court grants a higher level of seniority to new lenders in order
to borrow y. Under this assumption the countrys budget constraint and ex
ante welfare are given by respectively















The expected cost of dilution arising from the new priority lending in period
1 is captured in the term in  in the rst equation. Because of this cost the
sovereign must promise a larger D02 to nance the same g, and therefore faces
a higher probability of default (for the same level of borrowing g). The second
equation captures the welfare benet of dilution (the term in ). As the second
equation makes clear, as long as  is positive it is preferable to allow for dilution
or to grant higher priority to new lenders in period 1.
Proposition 10 It may be optimal for the bankruptcy court to grant seniority
to post-default lenders over pre-default lenders.
Proof. See discussion above.
The right to grant higher priority to new lenders given to a bankruptcy
court is essentially the same as the right to grant debtor-in-possession lending
in corporate bankruptcy regimes. Note that the original creditors su¤er from
the dilution so they would never vote for it if given the opportunity. The
optimal conditional dilution policy cannot, therefore, be implemented simply
by coordinating creditors ex post. The court must be granted the discretionary
power of deviating from the absolute priority rule.28
28However, this could introduce a distortion if the court puts more weight on the welfare of
the debtor country than on the welfare of the creditors. Discretionary dilution, then, would
be too lenient for the debtor.
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10 Concluding comments
We have shown that under laissez faire equilibrium sovereign debt structures
are likely to be ine¢ cient. In the absence of any seniority rule sovereigns have
an incentive to dilute outstanding debt that is relatively easy to restructure by
issuing debt that is hard to restructure. At the same time, if debt markets
anticipate such dilution, sovereigns may also have an incentive to issue hard-
to-restructure debt as a way of forestalling future dilution. Our analysis, thus,
does not support the Panglossian view that sovereign debt contracts are e¢ cient
ex ante and that there is no scope for welfare-improving reforms. Our model
mainly points in the direction of policy interventions that aim to enforce an
absolute priority rule for sovereign debt, and highlights potential weaknesses of
recent policies towards facilitating restructuring directly by inserting collective
action clauses into bond contracts.
We think that this line of analysis could be pushed in several directions of
future research. First, it would be interesting to see how the analysis would be
a¤ected if we allowed debt to be traded in the secondary market. It would then
be conceivable that n-debt can be turned into r-debt (if it is purchased by large
investors), or conversely that r-debt is turned into n-debt (if it is purchased
by small vulture funds). If this transformation can be achieved costlessly
through transactions in the secondary markets, the two types of debt should
have the same price in equilibrium, which we conjecture would still lead to
an excessive level of n-debt, since all the debt is likely to end up in the hands
of n-creditors who can better protect themselves against dilution.
Second, our analysis has ignored the role of o¢ cial lending to sovereigns in
default. The perceived di¢ culty of restructuring sovereign debt was one reason
why the international community has sometimes resorted to large bailoutsto
resolve sovereign debt crises. On the one hand, this lending may be a way of
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avoiding the deadweight loss of full defaults associated with n-debt, but it may
also lead to debtor moral hazard. On the other hand, if the o¢ cial sector is
senior to the private creditors, o¢ cial lending could also be viewed as a form of
dilution which could be used, in the context of a debt restructuring agreement,
as a form of debtor-in-possession lending.
Finally, although a 3-period time structure is useful to keep the analysis
tractable, it would be interesting to quantitatively estimate the impact of the
reforms considered in this paper in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium
model of sovereign debt. We leave these issues for future research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 4
An equilibrium with pure r-debt does not exist if and only if eDn < bDr, that
is if the interest rate is lower on n-debt after the sovereign has issued r-debt. eDn
must be smaller than bDr if replacing eDn by bDr in (6) raises the RHS (otherwiseeDn would not be the smallest solution to (6)). Thus a su¢ cient condition foreDn  bDr is





f(y)dy + bDr Z +1
2 bDr= f(y)dy;










f(y)dy   R 2x
0
y




(f(y)   f(x))dy, which is
positive if f() is increasing and negative if f() is decreasing. Thus, if f() is
increasing in the interval where default occurs under pure r-debt, [0; 2 bDr=],
then m() is increasing in the interval [0; bDr=] which, together with m(0) = 0,
implies m( bDr=) > 0. Hence, Assumption 1 implies eDn < bDr.
Proof of Proposition 8
We characterize the equilibrium of the debt market in t = 1, assuming that
the sovereign must borrow 2g from two lenders. There is a large number of
lenders of type r and type n who can make bids with or without monitoring.
First, consider the equilibria without monitoring. The possible bids are the same
as in Section 4: bDr, bDn, eDr and eDn. There is no equilibrium without monitoring
in which the sovereign borrows from two n-lenders (in such an equilibrium, an r-
lender can make a bid Dr that will be preferred by the sovereign, as shown in the
proof of Proposition 3). Similarly, there is no equilibrium without monitoring in
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which the sovereign borrows from two r-lenders (an n-lender could o¤er a better
bid, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4). So the only possible equilibrium
without monitoring is the same as in Proposition 4, with a mixed debt structure
( eDr; eDn). In such an equilibrium the sovereigns welfare is:




Next, consider bids with monitoring. Under perfect competition, each lender
just breaks even in equilibrium and therefore receives an expected payo¤ equal
to g plus the cost of monitoring . We then have four equations that implicitly
dene equilibrium bid functions D(
0; D0); one for each pair (; 0).
The mixed debt structure without monitoring, ( eDr; eDn), is an equilibrium
if lenders do not gain by deviating and o¤ering bids with monitoring. In an
equilibrium with monitoring, the lenders participation constraint is binding
and the sovereigns welfare will be given by,




where m = 1; 2 is the number of monitoring bids accepted by the sovereign.
This payo¤ can be higher than (9) only if Dn < eDn. This implies that all the
debt is renegotiable (Dn = 0) since a n-lender cannot break even with less thaneDn. Both creditors, therefore, must be of type r. In addition, they must both
monitor, since if one did not, an n-lender could make a protable bid with no
monitoring. The sovereigns welfare when it borrows from two r-lenders who
each incur monitoring costs  is therefore given by (10) with Dn = 0 and m = 2,
U0 = V0 + V1   2g + E(y)  2: (11)
This payo¤ is higher than (9) if and only if,






In sum, the equilibrium must be of one of two kinds: either a mixed debt
equilibrium ( eDr; eDn) with no monitoring, or a pure r-debt equilibrium with
monitoring.
Suppose that there are always at least two r-lenders in the market who
make bids with monitoring.29 Then the equilibrium is unique and depends on
the monitoring cost as follows: (i) if   , all the other r-lenders make bids
with monitoring and the sovereign borrows from two of them; (ii) if  >  all
the other r-lenders bid eDr, all the n-lenders bid eDn, with no monitoring in both
cases, and the sovereign borrows from one lender of each type.
Finally, suppose that the optimal bankruptcy regime with seniority is es-
tablished, and costs 2 to the sovereign conditional on a default. Then the
sovereigns ex ante welfare is equal to the rst-best level minus the expected
cost of the bankruptcy regime,




This is higher than the RHS of (11). The optimal bankruptcy regime, therefore,
yields a higher level of ex ante welfare than short-term debt with monitoring.
29This ensures that borrowing from two monitoring r-lenders is always an option for the
sovereign. Without this assumption, there would always be an equilibrium with no monitoring,
since an individual r-lender cannot gain from deviating and o¤ering to monitor alone if no
other r-lender o¤ers to monitor.
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